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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kirk Lee Pendergrass appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional plea of guilty to driving without privileges and without proof of
insurance.

Pendergrass claims the district court erred in affirming the

magistrate's denial of his motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
While on patrol, Officer Chris Olsen saw a Toyota pickup and entered its
license plate number into his onboard computer system. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 10, L.
11-p. 11, L. 5; p. 16, Ls. 1-15.) Records showed the registered owner was
Pendergrass.

(6/18/12 Tr., p. 16, L. 22 - p. 17, L. 8.)

Olsen then searched

Pendergrass' driving records and learned that his driving privileges were
suspended.

(6/18/12 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 11-14.) Olsen also accessed a previous

booking photo of Pendergrass through Ada County's booking system. (6/18/12
Tr., p. 21, Ls. 16-18.)
Olsen lost sight of the Toyota, but ten minutes later, saw it again.
(6/18/12 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 4-8.) Olsen still had Pendergrass' booking photo up on
his computer, and determined the driver was Pendergrass. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 22,
Ls. 18-21.)

Olsen initiated a traffic stop, based on the information that

Pendergrass' driving privileges were suspended. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 20, Ls. 3-9; p.
22, Ls. 20-21.)

Pendergrass was charged with driving without privileges and

without proof of insurance. (R., pp. 5-7.)
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Pendergrass moved to suppress all evidence before the magistrate court,
arguing Olsen lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop him because
there was inadequate time for Olsen to have identified him. (R., pp. 24-30.) At a
hearing on the motion, both Olsen and Pendergrass testified. (See 6/18/12 Tr.)
The magistrate concluded Olsen had valid reason to stop Pendergrass and
denied the motion. (R., pp. 53-59.)
Pendergrass entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to
appeal the magistrate's order denying his suppression motion.
Pendergrass timely appealed to the district court.

(R., p. 62.)

(R., pp. 64, 66-68.)

The

district court heard oral argument (see 2/20/13 Tr.), and on consideration of the
parties' arguments and the record, including a transcript of the suppression
hearing, the district court affirmed the magistrate's order (R., pp. 114-21).
Pendergrass again timely appealed. (R., pp. 123-25.)
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ISSUES

Pendergrass states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the Officer have a reasonable, articulable susp1c1on the
registered owner of the vehicle was the actual driver before
initiating the traffic stop?

2.

Did the magistrate court err when it concluded the Officer, in fact,
identified the Appellant as the driver of the vehicle even though the
testimony and dashboard video clearly do not support the ruling,
and therefore should the evidence that Mr. Pendergrass was
driving be suppressed?

(Appellant's brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
Has Pendergrass failed to show that the magistrate and district courts erred in
concluding that Officer Olsen had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop
Pendergrass' vehicle?
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ARGUMENT
Pendergrass Has Failed To Show That The Magistrate And District Courts Erred
In Concluding That Officer Olsen Had A Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion To
Stop Pendergrass' Vehicle
A.

Introduction
Pendergrass does not challenge that Officer Olsen properly determined

the vehicle's registered owner lacked a valid driver's license. (Appellant's brief,
p. 7.) But Pendergrass argues that Olsen lacked information to verify that the
vehicle's registered owner was also its driver when Olsen initiated the stop. (Id.)
According to Pendergrass, the magistrate and "district court on review" erred in
concluding Olsen had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Pendergrass was
both the registered owner and driver of the vehicle at the time of the stop. (Id.)
Pendergrass further contends the magistrate's factual findings are unsupported
by the record and are thus clearly erroneous.

(Id.)

Under the applicable

standard of review and Idaho law, Pendergrass' arguments fail.
B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court directly reviews a decision by a district court made in

its appellate capacity. State v. Decker, 152 Idaho 142, 145, 267 P.3d 729, 732
(Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted). The appellate court accepts the magistrate's
factual findings supported by substantial and competent evidence, but freely
reviews legal conclusions. State v. Green, 149 Idaho 706, 708, 239 P.3d 811,
813 (Ct. App. 2010); Decker, 152 Idaho at 145, 267 P.3d at 732. Where the
magistrate's decision is supported by the record and law, and where the district
court affirmed, the appellate court will affirm "as a matter of procedure." kl_
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Review of an order granting or denying a suppression motion
bifurcated.

is

State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 592, 261 P.3d 853, 869 (2011)

(citation omitted).

First, the appellate court accepts the trial court's factual

findings "unless they are clearly erroneous."

kl

Then, regarding application of

the law to those facts, the appellate court exercises free review.

kl

Determinations regarding witness credibility and the weight to be given
competing evidence at the suppression hearing are within the trial court's
discretion.

State v. Mangum, 153 Idaho 705, _, 291 P.3d 44, 53 (Ct. App.

2012) (citations omitted).

C.

Pendergrass Has Failed To Show Clear Error In The Magistrate's Factual
Finding
The magistrate found that Officer Olsen "identified Pendergrass as the

driver

of

the

Toyota

truck,

turned

around,

accelerated

and

stopped

Pendergrass." (R., pp. 57-58.) Contrary to Pendergrass' assertions on appeal,
the magistrate's findings are supported by the record. (Appellant's brief, p. 1113.) At the hearing on Pendergrass' suppression motion, Officer Olsen testified
that he saw a vehicle and did a search of its license plate using his in-car
computer system; it showed the vehicle's registered owner was Pendergrass.
(6/18/12 Tr., p. 9, L. 24 - p. 10, L. 12.) Olsen then did a search of Pendergrass'
driver's license and learned that Pendergrass' driving privileges were suspended.
(6/18/12 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 12-14.) Olsen also accessed Pendergrass' driving record
and a prior booking photo. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 20, L. 25 - p. 21, L. 22.)
Olsen lost sight of Pendergrass' vehicle. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 3-5.) But
ten minutes later, with Pendergrass' booking photo still on his computer screen,
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Olsen saw the vehicle again.

(6/18/12 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 5-8; p. 22, Ls. 18-19.)

Comparing his visual of the driver to the photo, Olsen confirmed the driver was
Pendergrass and initiated the stop. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 22, Ls. 20-25.)
The magistrate's findings comport with Olsen's testimony.

(R.,

pp. 54-

55.) In addition, the magistrate found that Olsen "did not recall his exact location
when he first viewed the Toyota driven by Pendergrass," and that Olsen "most
likely identified Pendergrass as the driver" when he passed Pendergrass' truck
the second time, rather than when he initially spotted the truck. (R., pp. 54-55;
see also 6/18/12 Tr., p. 22, L. 22 - p. 23, L. 4.)
Pendergrass challenges as "clearly erroneous" the magistrate's finding
that Olsen confirmed that the driver was Pendergrass before he initiated the
stop. (Appellant's brief, p. 12.) In support, Pendergrass cites Olsen's testimony
that he "can't say exactly how it happened," only what is "most likely."
(Appellant's brief, p. 12; 6/18/12 Tr., p. 23, Ls. 3-4 (emphasis added).)
Pendergrass thus argues that Olsen "could not testify with any certainty when,
where or how he identified Mr. Pendergrass as the actual driver." (Appellant's
brief, p. 12.) Pendergrass' argument ignores the context of Olsen's testimony,
and thus mischaracterizes it.
When asked if he identified Pendergrass as the driver when he pulled him
over, Olsen testified, without uncertainty or qualification, "Yes ... I was able to
see him, and the photo, and confirm it was him when I turned around to stop
him." (6/18/12 Tr., p. 22, Ls. 16-21.) When then asked if, "[p]rior to that, you
wouldn't have identified [Pendergrass] as the driver ... ?" Olsen responded that
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he could not say exactly how it happened, but could only "give you most likely."
(6/18/12 Tr., p. 23, Ls. 1-4 (emphasis added).) Consistent with this testimony, it
is possible that Olsen pulled up the booking photo fast enough that he saw and
identified Pendergrass before losing sight of him. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 23, Ls. 1-4.)
But whether or not Olsen did so is irrelevant. It is also immaterial that Olsen did
not recall "exactly how it happened." (6/18/12 Tr., p. 23, Ls. 3-4.) Of relevance
was Olsen's definitive testimony that he recognized Pendergrass from the photo
before stopping his vehicle. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 22, Ls. 16-25.)
In a further attempt to show clear error, Pendergrass points to Olsen's
dashboard video, which was admitted at the suppression hearing as Exhibit A.
(Appellant's brief, p. 12; see Exhibit A; see also 6/18/12 Tr., p. 28, Ls. 13-19.)
According to Pendergrass, this evidence shows "it is highly unlikely that Officer
Olsen could have identified" him as the driver given that they "passed each other
at a significant rate of speed." (Appellant's brief, p. 12.)
The actual speeds at which Olsen and Pendergrass were driving do not
appear to have been measured; this information was not offered or admitted as
evidence. Pendergrass established no basis for relying on the accuracy of his
testimony that he was driving "27 miles an hour," and that Olsen was driving, in
the opposite direction, "[b]etween 25 and 30." (6/18/12 Tr., p. 28, Ls. 13-19.)
The video admitted as Exhibit A provides no demonstrable support that the
vehicles were traveling at a "significant rate of speed." (Exhibit A.) As such, the
record does not support Pendergrass' claim that Olsen could not have identified
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Pendergrass given the vehicles' speeds. Pendergrass thus fails to show clear
error in this regard.
Finally, Pendergrass notes that he testified he was wearing a beanie,
sunglasses, and bulky coat when Olsen saw him.

(Appellant's brief, p. 12;

6/18/12 Tr., p. 26, Ls. 21-22.) At the suppression hearing, Olsen did not say nor was he asked - whether Pendergrass was wearing a hat, coat, or
sunglasses at the time of the incident. In fact, Olsen was not asked about any
impediments to his identification of Pendergrass. (See 6/18/12 Tr.,' p. 22, L. 1 p. 23, L. 4.) Olsen's testimony, which was strengthened rather than diminished
by cross-examination, was that he identified Pendergrass based on the booking
photo. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 22, Ls. 20-21.)
The magistrate weighed the evidence and found, in keeping with Olsen's
testimony, that Olsen saw the photo and confirmed the driver was Pendergrass
before he initiated the traffic stop.

This finding was supported by substantial

evidence, and Pendergrass has failed to demonstrate any basis to disturb it on
review. Mangum, 153 Idaho at_, 291 P.3d at 53.
D.

Applying The Law To The Facts Found By The Magistrate, Officer Olsen
Had A Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion To Stop Pendergrass' Vehicle
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and

seizures.

State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012).

To

conduct an investigatory stop in accord with the Fourth Amendment, police must
have "a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that 'criminal activity
may be afoot .... "' U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citation omitted); see
also State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, _, 294 P.3d 1121, 1124 (2013).
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The

suspicion on which an investigatory stop is based must be more than "a mere
hunch." State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 59, 266 P.3d 1161, 1164 (Ct. App.
2011) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). But the required quantity and
quality of information is less than that needed to establish probable cause.
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990); State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,
811,203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). In evaluating the validity of an investigatory
detention, the reviewing court looks to the "totality of circumstances" known to
the arresting officer at the time. Johnson, 152 Idaho at 59, 266 P.3d at 1164
(citation omitted).
The magistrate found that Officer Olsen saw a vehicle and learned that its
registered owner was Pendergrass, and that Pendergrass' driving privileges were
suspended. (R., p. 54.) Olsen then saw a booking photograph of Pendergrass.
(R., p. 54.) After losing sight of the vehicle, Olsen saw it again, and identified

Pendergrass as the driver before initiating a stop of the vehicle. (R., pp. 57-58.)
As already discussed, these findings are supported by the record. (See supra.)
Given these circumstances, Olsen had well more than a hunch that the driver
was engaged in unlawful activity - in other words, that Pendergrass was driving
with a suspended license. See Johnson, 152 Idaho at 59, 266 P.3d at 1164.
In arguing that police lacked a legal basis to stop his vehicle, Pendergrass
misreads the Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 117
P.3d 876 (Ct. App. 2005). In Cerino, police received an anonymous tip that "a
white Nissan pickup bearing
transporting illegal drugs."

~

1B (Bannock County)

license plates was

at 737, 117 P.3d at 877. A detective saw a truck
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matching that description parked at a residence, and learned from dispatch that
it was registered to Silas and Robin Cerino. ~ When the detective saw a man

leave the residence and drive away in the vehicle, he asked dispatch to check
Silas Cerino's driver's license; dispatch informed him that Silas Cerino did not
have an Idaho driver's license.

~

A fellow officer stopped the driver for

operating a vehicle without a valid license; upon confirming the man was Cerino,
the officer arrested him for driving without a license.

Id.

Later, officers

discovered methamphetamine in the vehicle, and Cerino was charged with
possession.

~

Cerino moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the officer's
investigative stop, but the district court denied the motion.
Court of Appeals reversed.

~

~

at 738-39, 117 P.3d at 878-79.

On appeal, the
The Court held

that the anonymous tip, plus the unrelated information that the vehicle's male
owner lacked an Idaho driver's license did not amount to reasonable suspicion
that the driver was involved in criminal activity.

~

Cerino is distinguishable from

Pendergrass' case on its facts.
In Cerino, the Court noted that the police "had no information as to
whether Cerino held a driver's license from another jurisdiction," which would
have permitted Cerino to lawfully drive.

~

at 738, 117 P.3d at 878. Here, the

police knew Pendergrass' driving privileges were suspended such that he could
not lawfully drive. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 11-14.) The Cerino Court also found it
significant that the police had no physical description of Cerino, except his
gender. Cerino, 141 Idaho at 738, 117 P.3d at 878. Here, Officer Olsen had a
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photograph of Pendergrass with which to confirm the driver's identity before
stopping the vehicle.
circumstances,

(6/18/12 Tr., p. 22, Ls. 18-21.)

Olsen

had

a

reasonable,

Given the totality of

articulable

suspicion to

stop

Pendergrass' vehicle.
Pendergrass'

remaining

argument misreads the magistrate court's

analysis, and in any event, ignores that this Court exercises free review in
applying the law to the facts.

According to Pendergrass, the magistrate court

erred by "not taking into consideration whether Officer Olsen identified Mr.
Pendergrass as the driver of the vehicle . . .. "

(Appellant's brief, p. 8.)

Pendergrass bases this assertion on the magistrate's conclusion that there was
a valid reason for Olsen's stop because "Pendergrass' driving privileges were
suspended." (Appellant's brief, p. 11; R., p. 59.)
Pendergrass' argument ignores the magistrate's finding, earlier in the
order, that Olsen "identified Pendergrass as the driver of that truck." (R., pp. 55,
59.)

Examining the findings and analysis of the order, and not just the

concluding paragraph, the magistrate properly found both that the officer
identified Pendergrass as the vehicle's driver and that Pendergrass was engaged
in criminal activity - driving with a suspended license.

(R., p. 59.)

Because

issues of law are freely reviewed on appeal, this Court applies the law to the
magistrate's findings, regardless of the magistrate's legal conclusions. Draper,
151 Idaho at 592, 261 P.3d at 869. As already discussed, correct application of
the law to the magistrate's findings shows that Pendergrass' motion to suppress
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was properly denied. Therefore, the district court's order affirming the denial of
Pendergrass' suppression motion must be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order affirming the magistrate court's denial of Pendergrass' motion to suppress.
DATED this 5th day of November, 2013.

DAPHN J.HUANG
Deputy Attorney General
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